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Abstract
I consider transactions involving asymmetric prisoners’ dilemmas
between pairs of players selected chosen from two large
populations. Games are played repeatedly, but information about
cheating is not adequate to sustain cooperation, and there is no
official legal system of contract enforcement. I examine how profit-
maximizing private intermediation can supply the information and
enforcement. I obtain conditions under which private governance
can improve upon no governance, and examine why it fails to
achieve social optimality.







All economic transactions, except spot exchanges of goods or services with objectively known
attributes, oﬀer opportunities for one or both or all of the parties to cheat for their own gain
at the expense of the others. In turn, the expectation of suﬀering a loss due to such cheating
can make all prospective participants unwilling to enter into a transaction that would beneﬁt
them all if the cheating could be checked. Therefore almost all economic transactions need
governance.
Much of economic theory assumes that an oﬃcial legal system provides this service. We
used to assume that the law worked perfectly and costlessly. Recent theory has carefully
speciﬁed the informational requirements of veriﬁability for contracts to be enforceable, and
internal agency problems are recognized when the focus is on the operation of the system as
such. But the system is usually assumed to operate in an objective and impartial manner;
speciﬁcally, it is assumed to have a monopoly over the use of force, and to aim to maximize
social welfare.
However, such an objective and oﬃcial legal system is a rarity, approximated only in
a few advanced countries and only in recent times. In most countries and at most times,
formal governance has been lacking, corrupt, or too slow to be eﬀective. But economic life
has gone on, and societies have developed alternatives modes of governance. Even when the
oﬃcial legal system is generally eﬀective, alternative methods coexist: disputes in labor and
ﬁnancial transactions are often settled by arbitration, and illegal or semi-legal transactions
are governed by equally extra-legal methods of justice.
Understanding the operation of these alternative modes of governance is of considerable
interest in its own right. It can also lead to a better understanding of the oﬃcial system, and
even more importantly, of the interrelations among the modes — Can alternative governance
modes do as well as, or perhaps even better than, the oﬃcial law? Are diﬀerent modes
mutual substitutes, or can they be complements?
In this paper I will oﬀer a perspective on some general issues of governance and contract
enforcement, and some modeling of a particular mode, namely private intermediation. I do
not claim to have any big or startling answers, but I do pose many interesting questions,
answer a few, and develop approaches that promise more answers. I hope thereby to convince
readers that here is a large and rich ﬁeld of research, ripe for further theoretical exploration.
2A C l a s s i ﬁcation
The oﬃcial legal system in modern advanced countries provides a benchmark against which
the alternatives are measured. Economic and legal scholars have constructed numerous
models where such an institution is designed to maximize social welfare, taking into account
various constraints on information and policy and individuals’ optimal responses. Polinsky
and Shavell (2000) have surveyed this research.
One alternative to the formal legal system that economic theorists have studied most
fully is self-governance, modeled as equilibria in repeated interactions. The research most
relevant for my purpose is that dealing with the resolution of prisoners’ dilemmas played by
2pairs matched from a large population. If any speciﬁc pair is unlikely to meet frequently,
the usual tacit cooperation sustained by threats of reversion to non-cooperation may seem
implausible. In fact considerable progress has been made, based on Kandori’s (1992) model
of multilateral punishments that spread in the population by contagion. Ellison’s (1994)
generalization of this model is probably the deﬁnitive statement of the theory today. There
is also much empirical evidence on the matter. Greif’s (1993, 1994, 1997) case studies
and related theoretical models of the control of cheating among spatially separated traders
around the mediterranean are well known. Ostrom (1990) reports several case studies of the
governance of common resource pools; Ellickson (1991) studies the protection of property
rights among cattle ranchers in northern California; McMillan and Woodruﬀ (2000) discuss
private governance of contracts in emerging market economies, particularly Vietnam.
The theoretical and empirical literatures alike identify two diﬃcult problems which must
be solved by large populations trying to resolve prisoners’ dilemmas: collecting and conveying
information about previous cheating, and erecting a credible structure of punishments to
deter cheating. As usual in economics, these problems also oﬀer proﬁt opportunities for
individuals who can solve them. Anyone can, at a cost, collect information about cheating,
and sell it to prospective traders in the future. Business associations often collect and provide
such information to their members; the case studies cited above provide many examples.
Outsiders do this for proﬁt; credit rating agencies, or services that monitor the quality
of goods and services provided by ﬁrms, are well known examples. This is conceptually
similar to solving the problem of double coincidence of wants by introducing money. Such
an intermediary must solve two other problems — he must discourage free riding, by making
the information unavailable or useless to non-payers, and he must credibly promise not to
misuse the information, for example for extortion or double-crossing. But this is simpliﬁed
by the fact that the intermediary’s relationships with all customers are bilateral and non-
anonymous: while two traders may meet each other only infrequently, each of them can meet
the intermediary every period.
A suitably qualiﬁed intermediary can even inﬂict punishments on behalf of customers.
Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990) have a well known study of “law merchants” in me-
dieval France who performed both function. But my most dramatic example of private
intermediation comes from Gambetta’s (1993) excellent study of the Sicilian maﬁa. He be-
gins (p. 15) by recounting what a cattle-breeder told him: “When the butcher comes to me
to buy an animal, he knows that I want to cheat him [by giving him a low-quality animal].
But I know that he wants to cheat me [by reneging on payment]. Thus we need Peppe [that
is, a third party] to make us agree. And we both pay Peppe a percentage of the deal.”
Gambetta goes on to say (p. 16) that in this context “Peppe was mainly selling information,
... for this service ... he received a 2 percent commission. When in addition he acted as a
guarantor of quality and payment, the percentage increased.”
Of course the maﬁa engages in many activities, and Peppe’s intermediation may now
comprise only a small part of these, but it remains a good example for my purpose. In his
information role, Peppe resembles a credit-rating agency or even a restaurant guide, except
that he acts for both sides of the deal. In the guarantor or enforcer role, he resembles
the oﬃcial legal system, but has diﬀerent paths of information and diﬀerent methods of
3punishment, and is motivated by private proﬁt rather than by social welfare.
My modeling in this paper will focus on governance by private for-proﬁti n t e r m e d i a r i e s ,
but I will relate this mode to self-governance on the one hand and the oﬃcial legal system
on the other. I begin by mentioning a few related issues and some literature on them.
3 Some Related Literature
The oﬃcial system can cope only imperfectly with information asymmetries and problems
of commitment, and forms of self-governance can sometimes do better. This is the theme
of the new institutional economics, or transaction cost economics, pioneered by Williamson
(1985). These private responses consist of contractual and organizational innovations such as
hostage-giving and vertical integration that align the parties’ interests closer to the needs of
overall eﬃciency, but the oﬃcial legal system continues to play an important indirect role in
governing exchange. Analysis of corporate governance, whose main concern is with various
agency relationships within one ﬁrm, is likewise modeled under the umbrella of the oﬃcial
legal system; Tirole (2001) gives an authoritative overview and interpretative survey.
In this paper I focus on the governance of economic transactions, that is, enforcement of
contracts. Others have examined the enforcement of property rights. There, the whole stock
of assets of a person or a ﬁrm is in principle open to predation and needs to be protected.
In my analysis, participation is voluntary, and only the stocks or ﬂows that each side brings
into the transaction are at risk due to the other’s cheating. Olson’s (1993) analysis of private
governance by a proﬁt-maximizing “bandit” is well-known. He ﬁnds that the eﬃciency of
the bandit’s regime depends on the bandit’s time-horizon but falls short of that achievable
by a democratic government. The intermediary in my model has similar consequences but
for somewhat diﬀerent reasons. Other recent analyses of private enforcement of property
rights include Grossman (1995) and Anderson and Bandiera (2000).
Ramey and Watson (1999) study enforcement by a private intermediary, when the same
two players meet repeatedly. Transaction cost economics also often deals with situations
where only two or a few ﬁrms interact. My concern is enforcement in large populations
where repeated interactions in identiﬁed pairs are infrequent.
The role of intermediaries in search has been studied extensively; some recent papers are
Yanelle (1989), Gehrig (1993), and Rust and Hall (2001). Spulber (1999) has a thorough
analysis of intermediation between ﬁrms, using the transaction cost economics framework.
Private intermediaries often collect and provide information about product quality. This
has a moral hazard aspect (one side or the other may deliberately shirk or degrade quality to
reduce cost) as well as an adverse selection aspect (quality may be an innate characteristic
or type of one side unknown to the other). My model can handle the moral hazard aspect;
Lizzeri (1999) analyzes the adverse selection aspect. Rose (1999) considers search and quality
intermediation when the transactions are themselves about information, as in the “new
economy.”
Ad i ﬀerent but related approach distinguishes between relation-based and rule-based
modes of governance. In essence, the former is self-governance in a community based on
ongoing relationships and shared information, whereas the latter is the oﬃcial legal system
4operating at arm’s length based on public or veriﬁable information. While the distinction
has been known in general terms for a long time, and is sometimes uncritically attributed to
exogenous ethnic or cultural diﬀerences, the recent work of Li (1999) promises to put it on
a sounder economic basis. He recognizes diﬀerences between the costs of operating the two
systems. Relation-based governance has low ﬁxed costs (each relationship is sui generis and
no systemwide investment is necessary to sustain it) but high and rising marginal costs (be-
cause each relationship needs a reputational investment, and expansion of a business entails
transactions where one has successively weaker relational links with the counterparties, so
these require larger initial investment in building the relationship, and they carry a greater
risk of collapse). Rule-based governance has high ﬁxed costs (large legislative, judicial, and
informational costs are needed to establish the system and give it initial credibility), but
low and ﬂat marginal costs (once the system is established, one can deal with strangers).
The two systems can and do coexist. In the course of economic growth, and expansion
of trade and investment, one should expect the mix to shift away from relation-based and
toward rule-based governance. But the transition can be slowed or even stopped by many
problems — the diﬃculty of collective action in making the public investment needed for the
rule-based system, the political resistance of incumbents who have reputational capital sunk
in the relation-based system, and so on. This perspective, and the analysis of such transition
dynamics, seem another very promising avenue of research.
4 The Transaction
The starting point or basic transaction for my analysis is an asymmetric two-sided prison-
ers’ dilemma. The abstract theoretical literature on self-governance has usually considered
symmetric dilemmas; Tirole (1996) and Greif (1993, 1994, 1996, 1997) consider one-sided
dilemmas where only one party has the temptation to cheat. But most economic transactions
are inherently asymmetric, for example that between a buyer and a seller. Spread of infor-
mation about the other side’s cheating, and one’s own temptations to cheat, diﬀer greatly for
the two. For example, ﬁrms that produce durable consumer goods are usually in the market
for a long time, and their reputation for good or poor quality can be spread by the media.
Each consumer is in the market for such goods only infrequently, and may be tempted to
renege on payment unless the ﬁrms have a good network for exchanging information about
such behavior. I will consider such general asymmetric interactions.
The basic one-shot prisoners’ dilemma game involves two generic players, one from each
of Side 1 and Side 2, each with two actions, Honest and Cheat. The payoﬀsa r es h o w ni n
Table 1.
As usual, we assume Wi >H i >C i >L i,a n d
H1 + H2 > max(W1 + L2,W 2 + L1 ), (1)
that is, it is jointly better to have both players act honest than to let one of them cheat
the other. One further consideration is important in practice. People are not forced to play
this game; they may instead take an outside opportunity. Normalize that at 0. It is quite
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Side 2
Honest Cheat
Side Honest H1 , H2 L1 , W2
1C h e a t W1 , L2 C1 , C2
possible for one or both of the cheating payoﬀs Ci to be negative — even a low-quality good
costs something to produce, so the seller may be worse oﬀ than his outside opportunity if the
buyer reneges on payment. Therefore, if in any one period a player is matched with someone
who is known (or suﬃciently likely) to cheat, he may refuse to play. Or if C1 + C2 > 0a n d
credible spot transfer payments can be made, a deal that compensates him may be feasible;
for example if C1 < 0, then player 2 may give −C1 to player 1 for playing the game, so
player 1 ends up with 0 and player 2 with C1 +C2. To keep the algebra simple I will ignore
these complications and assume Ci > 0, but the other possibilities are worth further study.
There is a large population of players on each side. In each period every person from
one side is matched with one from the other. Repeat matchings are suﬃciently infrequent
that I will ignore them; this can be done rigorously as in Townsend (1981) and Milgrom et
al (1990), with a countable inﬁnity of people on each side and matching by rotation.
Much of the literature assumes that all players on each side are identical and rational
economic calculators. In some ways this makes it too easy to sustain an equilibrium in
which everyone acts honest. To make the model richer and more realistic I will assume,
following Tirole (1996), that the individuals on each side come in one of three behavior
types: [1] Honest. These form a fraction αi of the population on Side i.T h e y d o n o t
engage in any unauthorized cheating. Thus they play Honest except when authorized to
cheat in a punishment phase that is speciﬁed in the equilibrium. Later, when I consider
the intermediary, his Honest customers will also Cheat when he instructs them to do so;
then “obedient” or “conformist” may be better labels than Honest. [2] Dishonest. These
form a fraction βi of the population on Side i. They live just one period; therefore they
have no reason to retain any reputation for good behavior, and they always play Cheat.
[3] Opportunist. These form a fraction γi =1− αi − βi of the population on Side i.T h e y
calculate the beneﬁts and costs of cheating using standard dynamic programming and make
their privately optimal choices. My presumption is that Opportunists comprise a large
proportion of the population, and that Honest and Dishonest types have smaller proportions.
Each period, random pairings are formed from the two populations. (In the case of
rotating pairings from a countable double inﬁnity, the types are randomly distributed in the
sequence of players on each side). The discount factor is δ. The Honest and Opportunist
people on Side i have a probability (1 − λi) of dying and being replaced by a newborn of
t h es a m et y p e .T h es u r v i v a lp r o b a b i l i t i e sa r eλi; therefore the eﬀective discount factor of an
Opportunist on Side i is δλi.
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In this section I will consider stochastic stationary state equilibria without any external
enforcement. This will serve as an input to the analysis of governance using a private
intermediary. The basic structure is simple, I have already made some further simplifying
assumptions and will make more; the analysis is also conceptually very simple. Despite this,
matters quickly get involved, and the results become taxonomic. Therefore I will examine
only a few of the cases that seem especially prominent, interesting, or of expository value,
leaving the others for interested readers to construct or for future research.
The focus is on the choices of the Opportunists. Their incentive to take the Honest action
comes from the possibility that Cheating will become known. I assume a simple avenue for
this: each time an Opportunist on Side i takes a Cheating action that is not authorized as a
part of a punishment phase, with probability πi he will get a publicly observable Bad label
starting the following period and lasting as long as he lives. If he gets away with Cheating
on one occasion, the probability of getting a Bad label is no diﬀerent for any subsequent
Cheating action. This is a simpliﬁed version of the structure in Tirole (1996).
The πi will depend on the information channels among the players, for example gossip
networks as in Ellickson (1991). I will treat them as exogenous, and the pertinent case for a
large population is the one where πi are quite low. In future research the πi can be explained
in terms of the size or the spatial structure of the population, and in turn the group size
could be endogenized.
The fundamentals of the game are stationary, and I will consider stationary equilibria
with the following equilibrium strategies: When faced with an opponent who has a Bad
label, everyone plays Cheat, and players with a Bad label continue to play Cheat. This is
a Nash equilibrium of the stage game and therefore satisﬁes the requirement of subgame
perfectness.1 When faced with an opponent who does not have a Bad label, an Honest type
plays Honest and a Dishonest type plays Cheat; these types are not optimizing and their
behavior is determined by their type, so questions of subgame perfectness do nor arise. The
behavior of Opportunists is of two diﬀerent kinds corresponding to two diﬀerent types of
stationary states that can arise in diﬀerent parameter ranges to be determined below. The
label Hi (for i = 1 and 2) will signify that in that stationary state the Opportunists on side i
play Honest, and Ci will signify that they play Cheat, when meeting someone from the other
side without a Bad label. For example, a stationary state labeled (H1,C2) means that the
Opportunists on Side 1 play Honest and those on Side 2 play Cheat.2
In a stationary state, each player on each side has rational expectations about the be-
1Thus any tacitly cooperative outcomes will be sustained by grim trigger strategies. It should be possible
to do better using two-phase punishments with a “stick” phase that forces a cheater to take Li < 0, followed
by “carrot” phases with positive payoﬀs, arranged so that the overall two-phase punishment has the present
value of 0, the outside opportunity. But grim trigger strategies are simpler and convey adequate intuition
for my purpose.
2To avoid confusion, note that when used as a label of a stationary state, the letter H or C is roman and
the number 1 or 2 is not a subscript, and when used as the symbol for a payoﬀ in the stage game, the letter
H or C is in math italics and the number 1 or 2 is a subscript.
7havior of his randomly matched opponents on the other side. Let φa
i denote the probability
that a randomly picked Side i player will play Honest, φb
i the probability that he will play
Cheat but does not have a Bad label, and φc
i =1− φa
i − φb
i the probability that he has a
Bad label.
In an Hi stationary state,
φ
a
i = αi + γi, φ
b
i = βi, φ
c
i =0. (2)
The calculation for a Ci stationary state needs care because people with Bad labels may die
and their successors are born without a Bad label. But a simple calculation yields
φ
a
i = αi, φ
b
i = βi + γi (1 − pi), φ
c
i = γi pi , (3)
where the pi are the ergodic proportions of Opportunists who have Bad labels. These can
be found in terms of the basic parameters of the problem. Since I do not need the precise
solutions, I relegate this to Appendix A.
To ﬁnd when an Opportunist who does not have a Bad label will or will not cheat, let V1
denote the expected present value payoﬀ for such an Opportunist on Side 1. This satisﬁes
the recursive relation
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The ﬁrst line results when the Side-1 Opportunist follows the candidate equilibrium strategy
(play Cheat when matched with someone who has a Bad label and play Honest otherwise),
and the second results when he deviates to play Cheat always. In each case the current payoﬀ
is the expected value from meeting various types on the other side with various probabilities
in the stage game. The continuation payoﬀ from the deviation includes the term with the
minus sign which is the expected cost of Cheating. This occurs only if the match does not
have a Bad label (probability φa
2 + φb
2) and in that event the probability that the Side-1
cheater acquires a Bad label is π1. If this happens, his punishment phase starts next period
(eﬀective discounting δλ1)a n dt h ep a y o ﬀ loss equals the diﬀerence between the optimum V1
and the expected value C1/(1 − δλ1) of the mutual Cheating payoﬀ for the rest of his life.
At the boundary where the Side-1 Opportunist is indiﬀerent between Honest and Cheat,
φa
2 (W1 − H1)+φb











This has an obvious interpretation: The left hand side is the expected immediate gain from
deviation, conditional on meeting a type without a public Bad label which is the only scenario
when deviation is a relevant concept, and the right hand side is the expected future cost of
the deviation. Then we can solve for the value at this boundary:
V1 =
φa
2 H1 + φb
2 L1 + φc
2 C1
1 − δλ 1
(6)
8If the stationary state is H2 (Opportunists on Side 2 are acting Honest), the fractions φa
2
etc. are deﬁned by (2), and then (5) and (6) deﬁne the critical value of π1 that will make
the Side-1 Opportunist indiﬀerent between Honest and Cheat. If the stationary state is C2
(Opportunists on Side 2 are Cheating), the fractions φa
2 etc. are deﬁned by (3) as functions
of π2, and then (5) and (6) deﬁne the critical value of π1, also as a function of π2.
If the actual π1 exceeds these critical values, then the Side-1 Opportunist’s best response
will be to act Honest, in each case when the Side-2 Opportunists have the speciﬁed behavior.
But we need one further condition: V1 >C 1/(1 − δλ1), or
φ
a
2 H1 + φ
b





Otherwise the Side-1 Opportunist will do better by voluntarily putting on a Bad label and
cheating all the time. I will assume that this holds, and that similar conditions in later
analysis are also satisﬁed.
One further point — if the gain from cheating is large enough, or the survival probability is
low enough, then the critical values of π1 may exceed 1, that is, even the certainty of getting
aB a dl a b e lm a yn o ts u ﬃce to deter cheating. Unless otherwise speciﬁed in the analysis to
follow, I will assume that such is not the case.
In which of the two types of stationary states, H2 or C2, is the critical value of π1 higher?
The answer turns out to depend on whether C1 − L1 >W 1 − H1 or the other way round.
In the former case, the Side 1 Opportunist’s one-time beneﬁt from cheating is higher if the
other side is cheating than if it is playing Honest, that is, the prisoner’s dilemma is more
acute in its “defensive” aspect than in its “oﬀensive” aspect. I will call this the Defensive
case, and the opposite the Oﬀensive case. Of course it is possible to have the Defensive case
f o ro n es i d ea n dt h eO ﬀensive case for the other side.
If the Defensive case prevails on Side 1, the one-time beneﬁts of cheating are larger for
a Side-1 Opportunist in a C2 stationary state than in an H2 stationary state, and therefore
a higher probability of getting a Bad label is needed to deter his cheating. Therefore the
critical value of π1 is higher in a C2 stationary state than in an H2 stationary state. The
opposite applies if the Oﬀensive case prevails on Side 1.
To see this more formally, consider the Defensive case for Side 1. Compare (2) and (3),
and note that in an H2 stationary state φa
2 is larger and φb
2 is smaller than in a C2 stationary
state. On the left hand side of (5), we have a weighted average of the two advantages of
cheating, with the φs as weights. The larger term C1 − L1 (this is the Defensive case) gets
the higher weight in the C2 stationary state and is therefore larger. From (6), we see that
V1 is smaller in the C2 than in the H2 stationary state, since H1 >L 1 and the coeﬃcient
of the larger term is smaller and that of the smaller term is larger in the C2 than in the
H2 stationary state. Therefore the right hand side of (5) is larger for any given π1 in the
C2 than in the H2 stationary state. Putting these two observations together, the critical π1
deﬁned by (5) is larger in the C2 than in the H2 stationary state.
It can also be shown that for a C2 stationary state, the critical boundary function π1(π2)
is downward-sloping in the Side-1-Defensive case, and can be upward-sloping in the Side-
1-Oﬀensive case if the oﬀensive beneﬁto fc h e a t i n gi ss u ﬃciently larger than the defensive
beneﬁt.
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Figure 1: Stationary States in the Defensive Case Ci − Li >W i − Hi
These calculations were for a Side-1 Opportunist; similar analysis for a Side-2 Opportunist
follows by interchanging the labels 1 and 2. Using all this information, Figure 1 shows the
full set of possibilities of stationary states when the Defensive case prevails on both sides.
The sides of the box are the ranges of π1 and π2, from 0 to 1 in each case. The vertical line
is the critical value of π1 for an H2 stationary state, and the downward-sloping curve to its
right is the critical curve π1(π2) for a C2 stationary state. To the right of this curve, a Side-1
O p p o r t u n i s tw i l la c tH o n e s tn om a t t e rw h a tS i d e - 2O p p o r t u n i s t sa r ed o i n g ;t ot h el e f to ft h e
vertical line a Side-1 Opportunist will Cheat no matter what Side-2 Opportunists are doing;
between the two, a Side-1 Opportunist will act Honest if and only if Side-2 Opportunists
act Honest. Similarly the horizontal line and curve governs the best responses of Side-2
Opportunists.
Putting together these responses, we can identify the possible stationary states. In the
four corner regions Opportunists on both sides have dominant strategies and we get cor-
responding stationary states, for example (H1,H2) in the northeast corner and (C1,C2) in
the southwest corner. These are the intuitive outcomes when the detection probabilities
are both very high and both very low respectively. In the other two corners, only one side
fears detection suﬃciently to act Honest even when the other side is Cheating. This may be
true in some instances. For example, since the survival probabilities also play a role, ﬁrms
may be long-lived and have enough reputational reasons for maintaining quality, whereas
Opportunist buyers may have shorter lives and renege on payment. In the middle regions
on each of the four sides of the box, one side’s Opportunists have a dominant strategy and
then the other side’s Opportunists play their best response; the labels and arrows in these
regions show the choices and the direction of causation. On the left side, for example, Side-1
Opportunists have a dominant strategy of Cheating, and this leads Side-2 Opportunists to
10C1 , H2 H1 , H2













Figure 2: Stationary States in the Oﬀensive Case Wi − Hi >C i − Li
Cheat too — Cheating spreads like an infection. Similarly, in the middle region along the
top edge, Honesty spreads by infection. Finally, in the central region of the box, there are
multiple stationary states (H1,H2) and (C1,C2), with either Honesty or Cheating on one side
sustained by like behavior on the other. The (H1,H2) state is Pareto preferred, and may get
selected by a focal point mechanism, but a lock-in to the (C1,C2) state remains possible. Of
course multiple stationary states need not mean multiple equilibria when full dynamics are
considered.
Now we can identify the parameter ranges where private intermediation can improve mat-
ters for this society. In the three regions to the north-east, the public detection probabilities
are high enough for self-governance to work automatically and no intermediation is needed.
In the three regions to the south-west, the probabilities are both low, both sides will cheat,
and two-sided intermediation (like that of Gambetta’s Peppe) can help. In the two regions
in the south-east and north-west corners, there is scope for one-sided intermediation. In the
inner region, self-governance is possible but not guaranteed; a clever potential intermediary
may gain by sowing distrust to keep the group in a (C1,C2) state without him.
Figure 2 is for the case where the oﬀensive aspect of the prisoners’ dilemma is the more
important on both sides. Now the critical boundary value of π1 is larger in an H2 stationary
state than in a C2 stationary state. This has some strange consequences. For example in the
middle region along the top side of the box, Honest is dominant for Side-2 Opportunists, but
this draws the response of Cheat from Side-1 Opportunists, yielding a (C1,H2) stationary
state. It seems plausible that honesty on one side will produce a dishonest response from
the other, but the opposite is less plausible. This makes me think that of the two cases,
the defensive case is the one more likely in reality. Also, for the oﬀensive case, the multiple
stationary states in the inner central region are (H1,C2) and (C1,H2). These are not Pareto-
11ranked, so selection between them is problematic. Once again we can identify the scope for
two-sided or one-sided private intermediation in diﬀerent regions of the ﬁgure.
There can be mixed cases, where the oﬀensive aspect prevails on one side and the defensive
aspect on the other. I will leave it to interested readers to construct the details of such
cases, but will point out that the inner central region will have stationary states with mixed
strategies.
This analysis of self-governance, by allowing asymmetry and heterogeneity, has produced
a much richer picture, and provided better insight into the possibility of multiple equilibria,
than previous literature. In particular, the scope for one-sided versus two-sided intermedi-
ation emerges clearly, and the existence of some cheating on the equilibrium path enriches
the analysis of intermediation to come. To save space, in what follows I will examine only
two-sided intermediation, leaving the one-sided cases for the readers.
6 Information Intermediary
In this section I will consider a private intermediary who tracks information about previous
cheating by individuals, and supplies this to his customers each period as their matches on
the other side are revealed. I will start by assuming that the intermediary is a monopolist,
and consider competition or contest for a monopoly later. I will call this intermediary Info
for brevity. Info has an indeﬁnite life, with a probability λ0 of surviving from one period to
the next; this is exogenous for now.
Info has to make individual contracts with each person; he cannot oﬀer an all-or-nothing
deal to the whole society and achieve a Coasian outcome. Therefore the equilibrium with
Info is not automatically guaranteed to be eﬃcient.
Info cannot observe the type — Honest, Opportunist or Dishonest — of any individual, in
particular of any newborns. If Info ﬁnds out about an act of unauthorized cheating, and then
sees that person around at a later date, he can infer that the person must be an Opportunist;
more on this later. Info’s detection technology is as follows.
Info’s cost in each period of serving one customer on Side i is denoted by Ii. I will assume
that if a customer of Info gets cheated, Info ﬁnds this out without incurring any further cost.
This may be because he provides his service by accompanying his customer (physically or
metaphorically) to the trade. This broadly accords with Gambetta’s (1993, p.36) description
of what Peppe does in his information role. Credit rating agencies, too, are likely to be told
by their customer ﬁrms or lenders if a buyer or borrower defaults. A customer who has just
been cheated probably actually gets a little satisfaction from complaining, but even if he
incurs a small cost of complaining, a contract like that in Milgrom et al (1990) will enable
Info to induce the customer to report the other party’s current cheating. I will subsume this
in the cost Ii.
In addition, Info can detect at a further cost any occurences where someone who is not his
customer gets cheated; for example he could increase πi at a cost. However, such detection
creates a free-rider problem. Side-2 Opportunists behave honestly even when their current
Side-1 match is not Info’s customer, because they know that Info will detect and report this
cheating to future customers — Info cannot credibly commit not to do so. Knowing this, a
12Side-1 trader, even when he is not Info’s customer, expects his Side-2 match to act Honest.
Thus he would gain nothing by paying Info, and can remain a free rider. Note that this
individual is not choosing between an Honest equilibrium and a Dishonest equilibrium; he
is merely calculating whether to pay Info given the equilibrium that prevails.
Info can solve this problem very simply — by not doing any direct detection at all, merely
relying on reports of his customers. This beneﬁts Info in two ways — it saves cost, and it
avoids the free riding by ensuring that people can cheat non-customers with impunity, which
also raises the value of being his customer and therefore enables him to charge a higher fee.
Info merely tells a customer either “I know your match has cheated in the past” or “As far
as I know, your match has not cheated in the past.” If Info says the latter and the other party
cheats this time, the customer has no recourse and Info will not inﬂict any punishment on
the other party.3 The customer has equally no recourse if Info lies about the other party’s
history (and extracts an additional fee from the other party for allowing him to cheat in
this way); we have to ﬁnd conditions under which the equilibrium is proof against cheating
by Info. Similarly, we have to check whether Info has any incentive to extract extortion
payments by threatening falsely to attach a bad label on someone with a clean record.
Now we can formally state the structure of the game in each period. (1) Info oﬀers
contracts. The contract for a Side-i trader has the following form: “pay me Fi now; then
when your match is revealed, I will tell you what I know of that player’s history”. (2) People
decide whether to become his customers. (3) Random pairings are formed; Info tells his
customers (not necessarily truthfully) what he knows about their matches’ history of actions,
and makes any double-crossing side-deals with the other side. (4) People observe whether
their matches are Info’s customers. Then they decide whether to play the dilemma game at
all, and if both want to play, the dilemma game is played. (5) Info keeps a record of any
cheating of his customers.
6.1 All-Customer Equilibrium
I n f oc a nm a k eap r o ﬁt by raising the expected payoﬀs for his customers. To save space
and avoid too much taxonomy, I will examine only one case of this, namely one where in
his absence the stationary state would be (C1,C2), he deals with both sides, and achieves
an (H1,H2) outcome. Even within this, I will focus on an equilibrium where everyone is
Info’s customer, and only brieﬂy consider cases of selective customership. But other cases
are worth future attention. In particular, if under self-governance the stationary state would
have been (C1,H2) or (H1,C2), then Info may deal with just one side and observe cheating
by the other side; credit rating agencies may be an example of this.
So consider the situation where everyone is Info’s customer. When playing against a
customer of Info, Honest types and Opportunists act Honest, whereas Dishonest types Cheat.
What about oﬀ-equilibrium behavior when meeting someone who is a deviant non-customer?
Now Opportunists and Dishonests will cheat. Honests may be inclined to give the deviant
the beneﬁt of the doubt and act Honest, but Info can tell them that the non-customer is
3I will consider enforcement intermediaries in the next section.
13sure to be a bad type and authorize or even instruct them to play Cheat. This is in Info’s
own interest as it lowers the payoﬀ to a non-customer, thereby raising the value of being a
customer and so the traders’ willingness to pay Info. Therefore I will assume that Info does
this.
Info’s own temptation to cheat must also be considered. He can extort an extra fee from
a trader with a clean record by threatening to label him a cheater. This is a bilateral game
between Info and each trader, and can be considered separately from the prisoners’ dilemma
of the traders; I will do so in a subsection below. Info can also double-cross a trader, by
taking an extra fee from the other side to let it cheat. This is considerably harder to analyze,
and I have only an imperfect answer in another subsection below. In the meantime I proceed
assuming that Info does not double-cross.
To calculate the willingness to pay, we need to know each person’s payoﬀsw h e nac u s -
tomer, and when not a customer. A Dishonest type who is not a customer will play Cheat.
An Honest type who is not a customer will play Honest (cheating is not an authorized action
or punishment phase in this situation). But then he is sure to get payoﬀ L1,w h i c hi sn e g a -
tive, so he would do better to take the outside option. I will allow Honest traders this much
rational calculation — as non-customers, knowing that if they played, their nature would
force them to act Honest, they stay out. Finally, consider Opportunists. It is intuitive that
an Opportunist non-customer will play Cheat: the reason not to pay the fee and join must
be that one wants to cheat. In fact cheating leads to quite complicated possibilities — the
cheater may acquire a public Bad label; even if not, Info will observe the cheating, since in
the candidate equilibrium being considered, the other party is his customer. But then again
Info may not survive to the next period so the cheater may be able to make a clean start.
The analysis in the Appendix B (Lemma 1) shows that the simple intuition does survive all
this calculation.
Table 2 shows the payoﬀs of Side-1 players, against all possible matches from Side 2,
and when the Side-1 players are Info’s customers (in the candidate equilibrium) or deviant
non-customers. The payoﬀs for Side-2 players are analogously constructed.
Table 2: Payoﬀs for Info’s All-Customer Equilibrium
Side-1 player Side 2 match
Type Customer? Honest Opportunist Dishonest
Honest Yes H1 H1 L1
No 00 0
Opportunist Yes H1 H1 L1
No C1 C1 C1
Dishonest Yes W1 W1 C1
No C1 C1 C1
The diﬀerence in expected payoﬀs for each type when a customer and when not a customer
14can now be calculated using the proportions of the types on Side 2 as probabilities. Thus
Honest: (α2 + γ2)H1 + β2 L1
Dishonest: (α2 + γ2)(W1 − C1)( 8 )
Opportunist: (α2 + γ2)H1 + β2 L1 − C1 =( α2 + γ2)(H1 − C1) − β2 (C1 − L1)
Comparing the Honest type’s gain to the ﬁrst expression for the Opportunist type’s, and
comparing the Dishonest type’s gain to the second form of the Opportunist type’s, we see at
once that the Opportunists have the smallest one-shot gain from being customers, and that
is positive by (7).
Honests and Dishonests do not do any intertemporal optimization, so their willingness
to pay Info is just the above diﬀerence. Opportunists do a more rational intertemporal
calculation. If Info extracts their whole one-shot gain as his fee, their present value payoﬀ
with Info will be the same as without him, namely C1/(1 − δλ1). Then they will join Info
for one period and cheat to get a bigger current payoﬀ, without any future loss. Therefore
Info must charge them less, that is, leave them enough current surplus, to induce them to
act Honest. The calculation is complex, and done in Appendix B. The result is as follows.
Info’s fee F1 must satisfy




δλ1 − λ0 (1 − π1)
π1
1−δλ1 + λ0 (1 − π1)
(10)
The term in the ﬁrst square brackets on the right hand side of (9) is the one-shot payoﬀ
diﬀerence calculated above. The term in the second square brackets is the customer’s one-
shot gain from cheating; multiplying this by the “eﬀective interest rate” ρ1 yields the surplus
Info must give away. The eﬀective interest rate depends on discounting, the probability of
public detection, and the probabilities of the customer’s and Info’s survival. If π1 =0( n o
public detection), then ρ1 =1 /(δλ0 λ1) − 1, while if λ0 =1( I n f oh a si n ﬁnite horizon), then
ρ1 =1 /(δλ1) − 1; these are the usual expressions for the interest rate. If λ0 < 1, then ρ1 is
larger, that is, Info must give away more surplus.
As π1 increases, the factor gets smaller, so Info need give away less surplus. Thus a
higher probability of public detection “paradoxically” helps Info; this is because quitting his
customership and cheating becomes a less attractive alternative. Of course, if π1 becomes too
large, then the risk of a public Bad label will be enough to keep Side-1 Opportunists acting
Honest even without Info’s intermediation, and knowing this, Side-2 traders’ willingness to
pay Info will drop sharply. Thus Info beneﬁts from some but not too much public infor-
mation about cheating. This mixed result of the model contrasts with Gambetta’s (1993,
pp. 24-28) unqualiﬁed argument that Peppe beneﬁts from creating endogenous distrust in
the population.
There is no guarantee that the upper limit on F1 will exceed I1, so the equilibrium may
not materialize because Info may not be able to make any proﬁt. I will proceed assuming
that F1 >I 1, and similarly on the other side.
15Since Opportunists have the lowest one-shot payoﬀ gain from becoming Info’s customers
anyway, and they have to get some rent, the maximum fee Info can charge them is low enough
to attract the other two types. Therefore, in the all-customer equilibrium being examined
here, Info’s fee will equal the upper bound in (9), perhaps minus some small amount which
I will ignore. (Info does not know the type of any individual and cannot engage in perfect
price discrimination. If someone engages in an act of unauthorized cheating and survives
to reappear the next period, Info can identify him then; but such individuals have to be of
the Opportunist type who have the smallest willingness to pay, so identifying them does not
give Info any ability to extract anything more from them.)
The calculations for the Side-2 customers’ willingness to pay are similar. Therefore Info’s
proﬁt per capita, in the candidate equilibrium where everyone is his customer, is
ΠI =[F1 − I1 ]+[F2 − I2 ]( 1 1 )
6.2 Extortion
The candidate equilibrium must be tested for Info’s incentives to adhere to it. One way Info
can cheat is to extort additional amounts at the last minute from a customer by threatening
to disown him and falsely asserting that he has a history of cheating.4 This is a one-sided
dilemma problem. Info has a bilateral relationship with each trader. In each period, the
game is as follows. The trader decides whether to become Info’s customer. If yes, then
Info decides whether to extort an extra payment. In a one-shot game, it is ex post optimal
for Info to extort, and therefore in the subgame perfect equilibrium the trader would not
become his customer. In the repeated game, an equilibrium where the trader becomes Info’s
customer and Info does not engage in extortion can be sustained by the grim trigger strategy
of reversion to the one-shot no-customership equilibrium of the bilateral game between Info
and this trader. The condition is that the one-period gain from extortion be less than the
expected present value of the subsequent loss. Info does not know any individual customer’s
behavior type (even though the Dishonests live only one period, any fresh faces could be
newborn Honests or Opportunists); therefore he can only charge the smallest willingness to
pay as the extra extortion sum. The discount factor is the product of the pure δ and Info’s




1 − δλ 0 λ1
[F1 − I1]( 1 2 )
If I1 is small, this is approximately δλ 0 λ1 > 1/2. If I1 is signiﬁcant, the test is more stringent.
We see that extortion is less of a problem the longer-lived are Info and his customers. Traders
on the more transient side have greater reason to fear extortion and should therefore be more
hesitant to become Info’s customers.
4In the equilibrium under consideration, everyone is a customer, and for Nash equilibrium we test only
deviations by one player at a time; therefore we need not consider extortion of non-customers.
166.3 Double-Crossing
The other way Info can attempt to gain by dishonoring his agreement with a customer is to
accept a payment from the other party in exchange for letting them cheat the ﬁrst party. If
there were no Dishonest types in the population at all (βi = 0), then a customer who got
cheated could infer with certainty that Info double-crossed him. The game between Info and
the customer would be exactly like the one above involving the possibility of extortion, and
a good equilibrium would prevail under conditions very like those obtained there, namely a
lower bound on δλ 0 λ1.
But when there are Dishonest types in the population (that is, when βi > 0, no matter
how small), a customer who gets cheated cannot be sure that Info double-crossed him; it
could be just the bad luck of having been matched with one of the Dishonests. Thus the
game between Info and an Opportunist customer has imperfect monitoring. The Side-1
Opportunist customer gets the low payoﬀ L1 with probability 1 if Info double-crosses, and
with the smaller probability β2 otherwise. The fact that Info’s double-crossing increases
the probability of the low payoﬀ enables the use of a grim trigger strategy that is initiated
probabilistically in the event of a low payoﬀ. In fact in the particular situation here, that
is the best that can be done. Therefore I assume that if the Side-1 Opportunist customer
gets the L1 payoﬀ, then a punishment phase is triggered with probability q1,a n dl a s t ss o
long as this trader lives. Thus q1 measures the severity of the punishment. The trigger is a
randomization device whose realization is observed with common knowledge by Info and this
one trader. In the punishment phase this trader becomes a non-customer and plays Cheat.
Since the stage game has an equilibrium where Info would double-cross a customer and
therefore the trader does not pay to become a customer, the common-knowledge expectation
of the punishment phase is self-fulﬁlling
An added complication arises if Info is ﬁnite-lived (λ0 < 1), because all customers in
this punishment phase are relased from it when their Info dies, which makes the population
proportions non-stationary. Therefore in this section I conﬁne the analysis to the case of an
immortal Info (λ0 =1 ) .
Even with the stationary structure and a special simple punishment, the analysis gets
intricate, because now in the stationary state there are some Opportunists in the punishment
phase who play Cheat. The mathematics in Appendix C yields the following results. Info’s






(W2 − H2). (13)
to prevent Info’s temptation to double-cross a Side-1 customer. Here κ1 and ν1 are the
population proportions of Side-1 Opportunists in the customer and punishment phases re-
spectively, and are themselves functions of q1.T h er i g h th a n ds i d eg o e st oi n ﬁnity as q1 goes
to zero, and is a decreasing function at least for a while. The condition to keep the Side-1
Opportunist customer from cheating stipulates the minimum rent that must be given; we
have







Figure 3: Conditions for Honesty and No Double-Crossing
where
ρ1 =
1 − δλ 1 (1 − q1 β2)
δλ 1 (1 − q1 β2)
(15)
is the eﬀective interest rate. As q1 increases, ρ1 increases. Therefore the upper limit on F1
in (14) is a decreasing function of q1.
Figure 3 shows the two constraints and the lens-shaped region where both are satisﬁed.
Of course the intersection may be empty for some ranges of the other parameters; then Info’s
governance becomes infeasible. When the region is non-empty, it makes sense to choose the
point with the smallest q1, since this is the probability with which the punishment is triggered
along the equilibrium path even though no double-crossing actually occurs.
6.4 Endogenizing Info
So far I have modeled Info as a monopolist, and there are indeed good reasons to do so; for
example, competing Infos would have to exchange information about any cheating against
each other’s customers, and that can open up the way to collusion and eﬀectively a monopoly.
But there can be ex ante competition to attain an ex post monopoly, and continuing struggle
to preserve it. Write KI for the up-front sunk investment to enter the contest to become an
Info, PI for the probability of success, and ΠI for the per-period proﬁt while enjoying the




1 − δλ 0
. (16)
We can think of this equation as endogenizing any one of the magnitudes. The per-period
18proﬁt ΠI might be endogenized by introducing expenditures needed to protect the proﬁt, or
continual advertising needed to convince the customers about the quality of one’s interme-
diation. The probability of success could be endogenous depending on the size and abilities
of the pool of potential Infos. The sunk investment KI could be endogenous, for example
advertising or acquiring a reputation for toughness, like an entry fee in a no-refund contest.5
Or an incumbent Info may have to engage in continuing contest with challengers trying to
take his place; this would endogenize his survival probability λ0. Interestingly, Gambetta
(1993) ﬁnds that if his Peppe “limits himself to selling information without guaranteeing
reliability, he will not [show ‘maﬁoso characteristics’]” (p. 18), and that “competition among
guarantors is perhaps the most common reason” for the use of violence (p. 40).
However, an endogenous λ0 may create other complications. If the intermediation is
highly proﬁtable (ΠI/KI is large), then competition will reduce the equilibrium λ0,a n dt h e
resulting Info with a short life-expectancy may be more tempted to engage in extortion or
double-crossing. Also (9) shows that a lower λ0 implies a lower F1 —am o r et r a n s i e n tI n f oh a s
to give his Opportunist customers more surplus to keep them Honest. Then the fee may not
cover Info’s cost. For all these reasons, it may be impossible to sustain a suﬃciently long-
lived intermediary precisely in those situations where the beneﬁto fe ﬀective intermediation is
large and therefore such opportunities are very proﬁtable. There may have been an element
of this in Russia during the last decade.
6.5 Selective Equilibria
There cannot be an equilibrium where only the Honest and Opportunist types are Info’s
customers: the Dishonests will be willing to pay more than the Opportunists, and since Info
cannot identify types directly and any separation must be achieved by pricing, any price
that attracts Opportunists will also attract Dishonests. But there may be an equilibrium
with only Honest customers, if Info charges a fee just less than the Honest types’ willingness
to pay. This gets him a larger revenue from a subset of the population, so if the proportion
of Honest types in the population is suﬃciently large, Info may make more proﬁti ns u c ha n
equilibrium than in the all-customer case. Of course, if only the Honest types on the other
side are customers, we must recalculate everyone’s willingness to pay. This is done for Side 1
in Table 3.
We see that Side-1 Honest customers are now willing to pay α2 H1 +( β2 + γ2)C1 =
α2 (H1 − C1)+C1. Opportunists are willing to pay only α2 (H1 − C1) minus rent, while
Dishonests are willing to pay α2 (W1 − C1). If Info charges the Honest customers’ full
willingness to pay, Opportunists will not sign up, but Dishonests may. The condition to rule
this out and make an Side-1-Honest-customer equilibrium possible is
α2 (H1 − C1)+C1 > α2 (W1 − C1), or α2 (W1 − H1) <C 1 .
This requires that there are not too many Honest customers on Side 2 whom the Side-1
Dishonests can exploit by signing up with Info. Of course, Info can get more proﬁtf r o mt h e
Side-1-Honest equilibrium than the all-customer equilibrium only if α1 is large enough.
5Hirschleifer and Riley (1992, chapter 10) analyze such contests.
19Table 3: Payoﬀs for Info’s Honest-Customer Equilibrium
Side-1 player Side 2 match
Type Customer? Honest Opportunist Dishonest
Honest Yes H1 C1 C1
No 00 0
Opportunist Yes H1 C1 C1
No C1 C1 C1
Dishonest Yes W1 C1 C1
No C1 C1 C1
The fact that the conditions take the form of a lower bound on α1 and an upper bound on
α2 suggests that there may be selective equilibria that are asymmetric in their composition
of customer types on the two sides; I will leave the study of this for future research.
7 Enforcement Intermediary
Now suppose the private intermediary is able to inﬂict punishment on a trader who cheats
one of his customers. I will call such an “enforcement intermediary” Enfo for short. I
assume that Enfo’s punishments are severe enough to deter any cheating by Opportunists.
It is unclear whether Enfo can inﬂict any eﬀective punishment on Dishonests. They live only
for one period, but Enfo might be able to make their deaths far more painful. I will assume
that Enfo cannot punish Dishonests. Even then it turns out that Enfo can achieve outcomes
that Info could not; an Enfo who can induce Honest action from Dishonests can do even
better. Later in this section I will consider another variant, where Enfo can punish cheating
only if both parties in a trade are his customers.
Thus the steps of the game in one period are: (1) Enfo oﬀers contracts of the form
“pay me Fi now, and if your match cheats you, I will inﬂict a terrible punishment on him.”
(2) People decide whether to become his customers. (3) Random pairings are formed. Each
player can observe whether his match is Enfo’s customer. At this point one of the traders
may choose to opt out and take the outside opportunity; the signiﬁcance of this will become
clear soon. But if both want to play, the dilemma game is played. (4) Enfo chooses his
punishment actions against anyone who has just cheated one of his customers.
Since Enfo does not provide any information about past actions of traders, there is no
question of his extracting an extortion payment from a trader by threatening to assert a bad
history. Enfo can still double-cross a customer by letting the other side cheat him without
punishment in return for an extra fee. As with Info, for clarity of exposition I will for the
moment ignore this possibility, and take it up in a later subsection.
Let Enfo’s cost of serving each customer on Side i be Ei. This includes the cost of identify-
ing the person as a customer, basically by “accompanying” him physically or metaphorically,
and discovering if he gets cheated. These activities are the same as the ones performed by
20Info, so Ei may not too diﬀerent from Ii.E n f om u s td e ﬁnitely incur an up-front cost KE,
which is quite likely to be large, in order to establish the necessary reputation for toughness
that makes people fear his punishments. Gambetta (1993, pp.42—43) discusses in detail the
nature of this reputation and the costs of acquiring it.6 If ever Enfo has to inﬂict an actual
punishment on a Side-i trader, he incurs an extra cost Zi;t h i sr e p r e s e n t st h er e a l - l i f er i s k
that the victim ﬁghts back eﬀectively, or is protected by someone else.
7.1 All-Customer Equilibrium
Consider when there can be an equilibrium in which everyone is Enfo’s customer. We can
construct a table of payoﬀs, and calculate the diﬀerence between the expected payoﬀsw h e n
a customer and when not a customer, thereby deriving the willingness to pay, exactly as we
did for Info. Table 4 shows the payoﬀs of Side-1 players, against all possible matches from
Side 2, and when the Side-1 players are Enfo’s customers (in the candidate equilibrium) or
deviant non-customers. The payoﬀs for Side-2 players are analogously constructed.
If Side-1 Honests and Opportunists engage in trade without being Enfo’s customers while
their matches on the other side are customers, Enfo would force them to act Honest and
get payoﬀ L1 < 0, so Honest and Opportunist non-customers would do better to take the
outside opportunity and get 0 payoﬀ.
Table 4: Payoﬀs for Enfo’s All-Customer Equilibrium
Side-1 player Side 2 match
Type Customer? Honest Opportunist Dishonest
Honest Yes H1 H1 L1
No 00 0
Opportunist Yes H1 H1 L1
No 00 0
Dishonest Yes W1 W1 C1
No C1 C1 C1
Now the Opportunists do not have any intertemporal decision to make, and they cannot
cheat while being Enfo’s customers (because their matches are also customers); so Enfo does
not have to leave them any rent. Therefore the various types’ maximum willingness to pay
is
Honest: (α2 + γ2)H1 + β2 L1
Opportunist: (α2 + γ2)H1 + β2 L1 (17)
6A chillingly understated deﬁnition of the task is at the end of the crime novel Cogan’s Trade by George V.
Higgins. Dillon, a respected and feared enforcer in the Boston mob, has died (of natural causes), and Cogan,
his protege and successor, is paying tribute: “he knew the way things oughta be done ... And when they
weren’t, he knew what to do.”
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Enfo can get everyone to become a customer by charging fees
F1 =m i n[( α2 + γ2)H1 + β2 L1 , (α2 + γ2)(W1 − C1)], (18)
and similarly for Side 2. It is easy to see that this exceeds the fee in (9) which Info could
charge in his all-customer equilibrium, for two reasons. First, the deviation strategy for Info’s
Opportunist customers was to cheat, when they could get C1. Enfo’s deviant Opportunist
customers have to drop out of the market and get 0, so their one-shot payoﬀ diﬀerence is
larger. Second, Enfo does not have to share any rent to induce the Opportunists to behave
honestly, and can extract the full one-shot payoﬀ diﬀerence. Thus, when costs are similar,
Enfo’s proﬁt exceeds Info’s. This conforms with, and provides a possible explanation for,
Gambetta’s observation (1993, p.15, quoted above) that his Peppe received a higher commis-
sion when he guaranteed quality and payment than when he merely provided information.
Ad i ﬀerent kind of all-customer equilibrium can arise if Enfo’s power to punish is limited
to occurences of cheating by a customer. That is, when a customer of Enfo gets cheated, Enfo
can mete out the punishment to the cheater only if the cheater is also his customer. Consider
a situation where everyone on both sides is a customer. Now everyone is compelled to act
Honest by the threat of the punishment. Thus all Side-1 customers get payoﬀ H1.A sd e v i a n t
non-customers, Side-1 Honest types would stay out (payoﬀ 0); therefore their maximum
willingness to pay Enfo is H1. As deviant non-customers, Side-1 Opportunist and Dishonest
types would Cheat and get payoﬀ C1 because their Side-2 matches, recognizing them as non-
customers immune to punishment who are going to cheat, would also cheat. (The Side-2
Honests would be authorized by Enfo to cheat.) Therefore the Side-1 Opportunists’ and
Dishonests’ willingness to pay Enfo is H1 −C1. Enfo can then charge a fee F1 just less than
H1 − C1 and attract all traders on Side 1; similarly on Side 2.
Here the traders (particularly the Opportunists and Dishonests) are willing to pay for
the privilege of being subject to Enfo’s punishment, because that enables them to make a
credible commitment to act Honest and get an Honest response from their matches on the
other side who are also customers. Schelling (1960, p. 43) made this point in connection
with the oﬃcial legal system: “Among the legal privileges of corporations ... are the right to
sue and the ‘right’ to be sued. Who wants to be sued! But the right to be sued is the power
to make a promise ... a prerequisite to doing business.” With the private Enfo, this has to
be a part of a mutually reinforcing system — this right is valuable to you in deals with others
who have also signed up as Enfo’s customers and will therefore credibly reciprocate your
honesty. Gambetta (1993, p. 20) also recognizes the importance of “purchasing protection
against oneself,” and Dasgupta (1988) oﬀers a formal analysis.
7.2 Double-Crossing
I consider the same simple stationary strategy for controlling double-crossing by Enfo as I
did for Enfo. This reintroduces some intertemporal calculation for Opportunists — they can
choose to be non-customers, but in that status they cannot cheat customers. The analysis is






(W2 − H2 + Z2), (19)
and an upper bound on the fee to control the customer’s deviation
F1 ≤ (α2 + κ2)H1 + β2 L1,. (20)
The lower bound is stiﬀer for Enfo than for Info, because by double-crossing Enfo saves
t h ed i r e c tc o s to fh a v i n gt oi n ﬂict the punishment, something that Info does not have. Thus
we have a tradeoﬀ in the matter of using Enfo or Info to achieve cooperation. While Enfo
has the advantage over Info that there is no question of his attempting extortion, his no-
double-crossing condition is harder to fulﬁll.
On the customer side, the upper bound on Enfo’s fee is higher than that for Info, again
because the customer’s alternative is worse and because Enfo does not need to share rent. The
right hand side of (20) diﬀers from the previous (17) which ignored double-crossing, because
now there are customers in the punishment phase so κ2 replaces γ2. But that depends on the
severity of punishment that controls Enfo’s double-crossing of Side-2 customers. Therefore
the right hand side of (20) is independent of q1.I naﬁgure like that for Info (Figure 3), the
rent constraint is a horizontal straight line. Otherwise the analysis can proceed similarly.
7.3 Endogenizing Enfo
Enfo can be endogenized using a zero-proﬁt condition similar to that for Info:
KE =
PE ΠE
1 − δλ 0
ΠE , (21)
If this determines λ0, then the relative life-expectancy of Info and Enfo will depend on which
has the lower ratio of per-period proﬁts to ﬁxed costs.
Although enforcement is more proﬁtable each period than mere information interme-
diation, becoming an enforcer also requires larger sunk investment. Then there may be
specialization by personal characteristics or transaction type. Would-be intermediaries who
are better able to make the large investments in reputation for enforcement become Enfos,
and those who are not, settle for work as Infos. Large transactions or more severe prisoners’
dilemmas, where proﬁts from intermediation are large enough to justify the investment, will
be governed by enforcement, leaving smaller transactions for information-based governance.
7.4 Selective Equilibria
Can Enfo make more proﬁt by selling his service to a subset of the population who are
willing to pay a higher price? The willingness to pay of each type on one side depends on
the customer composition on the other side. Therefore one must examine each combination
to see if it can be sustained as an equilibrium, and if so, what proﬁt Enfo gets from it. I
examine only a couple of the logical cases.
23Table 5: Payoﬀs for Enfo’s Honest-and-Opportunist Equilibrium
Side-1 player Side 2 match
Type Customer? Honest Opportunist Dishonest
Honest Yes H1 H1 C1
No 00 0
Opportunist Yes H1 H1 C1
No 00 C1
Dishonest Yes W1 W1 C1
No C1 C1 C1
Consider ﬁrst the possibility that only the Honests and the Opportunists on both sides
are his customers. The payoﬀs are shown in Table 5. Therefore the various types’ maximum
willingness to pay is
Honest: (α2 + γ2)H1 + β2 C1
Opportunist: (α2 + γ2)H1 (22)
Dishonest: (α2 + γ2)(W1 − C1)
Side-1 Honest and Opportunist types are willing to pay Enfo more than in the all-customer
case, because Side-2 Dishonests are now identiﬁed by the fact of their being non-customers.
If Enfo charges (α2 + γ2)H1, Side-1 Honest and Opportunist customers will pay it, and if
W1 − H1 <C 1, then Side-2 Dishonests will not pay it, sustaining the selective equilibrium
where Side-1 Honest and Opportunists are Enfo’s customers. The condition W1−H1 <C 1 is
stronger than the inequality W1−H1 <C 1−L1 that characterized the “defensive” case of the
prisoners’ dilemma, because L1 < 0. A similar analysis applies for customers on Side 2. Thus,
in a subcase of the defensive case, an equilibrium with Honest and Opportunist members
can obtain. Info gets more proﬁt from it than from the all-customer equilibrium if
(α1 + γ1)[( α2 + γ2)H1 − E1 ]+( α2 + γ2)[( α1 + γ1)H2 − E2 ]
> [(α2 + γ2)H1 + β2 L1 − E1 ]+[( α1 + γ1)H2 + β1 L2 − E2 ]
Enfo may go even farther to charge a fee that leaves only the Honest customers. I will
omit the details. It can be shown that the situation where Enfo charges α2 H1 + β2 C1 to
Side-1 customers and the corresponding fee for Side 2, and only the Honests join, is an
equilibrium provided α2 (W1 − H1) <C 1 and a similar condition on the other side. Since
my presumption is that γ2 is large compared to β2, it is likely that this fee is less than that
for the Honest-and-Opportunist equilibrium. Therefore this more selective equilibrium is
unlikely to be proﬁtable for Enfo. However, the analysis points out that for some fees there
may be multiple equilibria. How Enfo can bring about a particular one among them is not
clear.
248 Social Optimum Comparisons
The private intermediary can bring about an equilibrium with more honest actions than
w o u l dh a v eb e e np o s s i b l ei nh i sa b s e n c e . A saf r i e n d( w h oh a sa s k e dn o tt ob en a m e d )
remarked: “Gambetta’s Peppe serves a useful purpose in an imperfect world; I wish I could
be sure of that for myself.” However, the equilibria with Info or Enfo can fall short of social
optimality for many reasons.
The most obvious is the discrepancy between the gains of the traders and what the
intermediary can extract as his fee. There are numerous cases to consider, and I will sketch
only the most prominent ones to make my point. In particular, I will suppose that most of
the people are Opportunists, that is, γi ≈ 1, and focus on just the gains and fees for these
types.
Suppose the equilibrium with self-governance would have been (C1,C2) where the Oppor-
tunists on both sides Cheat, but that the intermediary can establish an (H1,H2) equilibrium
where they act Honest. Then the expected payoﬀ gain of a Side-1 Opportunist is approx-
imately (H1 − C1). To the same approximation, the fee he pays to Info can be found by
setting is α2 = β2 =0i n( 1 4 ) ;i ti s
κ2 H1 − C1 − ρ1 κ2 (W1 − H1).
Recall that κ2 is the proportion of Info’s Opportunist customers who are not in the punish-
ment phase of the bilateral game that controls Info’s incentive to double-cross them; even
when γ2 ≈ 1, κ2 < 1. Therefore Info’s fee is less than the customer’s gain H1 − C1: Info
cannot extract all the surplus he creates. Then he may not be able to provide his services
proﬁtably even when it is socially desirable to have them, or more generally, will underinvest
in intermediation.
If instead the intermediation is done by Enfo, the fee is κ2 H1. This could exceed the
customer’s gain (H1 −C1)i fκ2 is large enough: Enfo may be able to extract more than the
surplus he creates. There are two reasons: (1) Enfo does not have to leave any rent; (2)in
an equilibrium with Enfo, each customer’s alternative is not the self-governance equilibrium
(where he could cheat and get C1), but merely dropping out of the game altogether and
getting zero. Thus Enfo may become a parasite, who extracts from society more than the
beneﬁt he conveys by his governance, but the group is helpless unless it can solve a collective
action problem to get rid of Enfo. This seems to describe some situations of maﬁar u l e .
Investment in private intermediation can easily take the form of costly activities that
dissipate the rent; this is another reason for social suboptimality. This problem is especially
severe with Enfo, because he has the greater proﬁt potential.
Third, in my model double-crossing is controlled by punishments that are triggered along
the equilibrium path even when the intermediary has not cheated. While it may be possible
to do better than the simple punishment I assumed, in this game of incomplete information
about type and imperfect information about action, any punishment that controls double-
crossing is likely to entail some cost. If an oﬃcial legal system can credibly commit itself to
honorable behavior in this regard, it can avoid this cost.
I have compared private intermediation with an ideal social optimum having the same
information technology. A real-life oﬃcial legal system may have its own problems. Its
25internal agency problems may reduce its information capabilities. Its oﬃcials may be biased
or corrupt. And the prospect of attaining a position where one can earn bribes may set oﬀ
a rent-seeking competition that dissipates resources, just like the ex ante contest to become
the private intermediary. A better comparison of private and public enforcement needs a
better model of the public law system.
9 Conclusions and Ideas for Further Research
I have explored a model of contract governance in large-group interactions by proﬁt-motivated
private intermediation, and its links to self-enforcement on the one hand, and an ideal social
optimum on the other hand. I hope some results of this simple exercise are interesting.
In particular I would like to point out the following: [1] Under self-governance, the choice
between Honesty and Cheating for each side interacts with the similar choice on the other
side, producing diﬀerent possible and multiple stationary states, and scope for one-sided or
two-sided private for-proﬁt governance. [2] A better public information system can locally
increase rather than lower the intermediary’s proﬁt. [3] Intermediation by provision of infor-
mation diﬀers from that by punishment of cheaters in many ways. The latter can give the
intermediary more proﬁt than the social beneﬁts from his presence by worsening the alter-
natives of his customers. [4] Private intermediation may be infeasible just when it is most
valuable, because the prospect of a large proﬁtc r e a t e saﬁerce contest, which shortens the
horizon of the intermediary and threatens the conditions needed to sustain good behavior in
repeated interactions.
However, this simple exploration is far from being an end in itself. I intend it to be a mere
ﬁrst step in what promises to be an interesting and potentially valuable area of research.
To keep this initial exploration as simple as possible, I made several simplifying assump-
tions and examined only a few of the possible cases. For a better account of reality, these
need to be altered or relaxed. First, the case where one side or the other gets a worse
payoﬀ in the cheating outcome of the prisoners’ dilemma than its outside opportunity, that
is, where C1 or C2 is negative, should be analyzed. Second, good outcomes of the repeated
interactions may be achievable for a bigger range of parameters, and at a smaller cost of
coping with imperfect information, than the simple trigger strategies I have used; this needs
to be studied. Third, other technologies for gathering and spreading information should be
explored — can Info carry out explicit detection without running into free riding, and will
the public Bad label process help or hurt Info’s proﬁt from explicit detection?
Even more important are the larger questions this framework suggests. The members of
any large group are engaged in many diﬀerent kinds of economic interactions, with diﬀerent
payoﬀs, diﬀerent possibilities of cheating, and diﬀerent forms of repetition, than the simple
prisoners’ dilemma that I modeled. Will a common system of governance cope with them
all, or will diﬀerent modes have diﬀerent comparative or absolute advantages for governing
diﬀerent transactions? Can there be multiple equilibria, where either mode can persist once
it gets established, even though another may have better properties? Should one expect a
shift from one mode to another during the process of economic growth or expansion of trade,
as Li (1999) suggests? Can the existence of multiple equilibria give rise to lock-in?
26Governance of transactions is a very basic issue in economics. Much progress has been
made in understanding it, but much more remains to be done. I hope this small contribution
will draw greater interest and attention from theorists and spur more rapid and sustained
progress.
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A: Ergodic Proportions of Bad Labels
Consider the stochastic stationary state where Opportunists cheat. On Side 1, let p1 denote
the proportion of Opportunists who have a Bad label in the stochastic stationary state. Of
those with a Bad label, a fraction λ1 survive to the next period. Of the other (1 − p1), a
fraction (1 − γ2 p2)m e e tS i d e - 2p l a y e r sw i t h o u taB a dl a b e l . 7 The act of cheating in this
interaction will earn the Side-1 cheaters a Bad label with probability π1,a n daf r a c t i o nλ1
of them will survive to the next period. In the stochastic stationary state, therefore
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=1− γ1 p1 . (A.2)
Then (p1,p 2) are found by simultaneous solution of these equations.











1 − λ2 + λ2 π2
!
.
As λ1 or π1 increases, the curve (A.1) shifts to the right, so p1 increases and p2 decreases. As
γ1 increases, the curve (A.2) shifts downward so p1 increases and p2 decreases. The eﬀects
of shifts in λ2, π2 and γ2 can be found similarly.
B: The Opportunist As Info’s Customer
Suppose all groups on Side 2 are Info’s customers. Consider a Side-1 Opportunist. He takes
as given the strategies of the other players:
Info: (1) Will let his Side-2 customers cheat a Side-1 non-customer; in fact he will
instruct and authorize his Side-2 Honest customers to do so. (2) Will record any instance
where a customer gets cheated, and report the cheater’s history to future customers, and
allow or instruct them to play Cheat against the previous cheater, even though the cheater
may oﬀer to sign up as a customer later.
Side-2 Honests will act Honest unless authorized by Info to play cheat. Dishonests
will play Cheat no matter what. Opportunists will play Honest against Info’s customers
with no known history of cheating; they will play Cheat against non-customers.
7Remember that Opportunists form a proportion γ2 of the population on Side 2, and of these a fraction














Figure 4: Stationary State Proportions of Bad Labels
Of course these other strategies must also be checked for best response properties. The
strategy of Side-2 Opportunists is checked in the same way as the analysis for Side 1 below;
Info’s incentives to deviate (by extortion or double-crossing) are discussed in the text.
Let V1 denote the present value payoﬀ t oaS i d e - 1O p p o r t u n i s tw i t hac l e a nh i s t o r y .H e
can take any of four actions this period: [1] He can become Info’s customer by paying F1,
and act Honest. Then the one-shot game will give him a payoﬀ (α2 + γ2)H1 + β2 L1,a n d
the continuation value V1 starting next period. [2] He can become a customer by paying F1,
but Cheat. The one-period payoﬀ is higher, (α2 +γ2)W1 +β2 C1;l e tb V1 be the continuation
value starting next period. [3] He can stay a non-customer but act Honest. All of his Side-2
matches will Cheat, so he will get a current-period payoﬀ L1, but his record will stay clean
and the continuation payoﬀ will be V1. [3] He can stay a non-customer and play Cheat.
This will get him a current-period payoﬀ C1, and the continuation payoﬀ b V1.T h ee ﬀective
discount factor taking into account the probability of this player’s survival is δλ1.
Therefore his dynamic programming problem is
V1 =m a x { (α2 + γ2)H1 + β2 L1 − F1 + δλ1 V1 (B.1)
(α2 + γ2)W1 + β2 C1 − F1 + δλ1 b V1 ,
L1 + δλV1 ,C 1 + δλ1 b V1 }
The continuation value b V1 after a Cheating action can be decomposed as follows. With
probability π1 this will earn a public Bad label, and all future matches will play Cheat, so
this player will also play Cheat and get C1 every period; the present value is C1/(1 − δλ1).
With probability (1 − π1) there will be no public bad label, but since all players on Side 2
are Info’s customers in the stationary state we are testing, Info will ﬁnd out. If Info survives
29until the next period (probability λ0), he will instruct all his Side-2 customers to Cheat,
and the Side-1 customer will get the one-shot payoﬀ C1 and the continuation value b V1 again.
With probability (1 − λ0), Info will not survive, when the Side-1 Opportunist can make a
fresh start, value V1.T h u s
b V1 = π1
C1
1 − δλ1
+( 1− π1)λ0 [C1 + δλ1 b V1 ]++ ( 1− π1)(1 − λ0)V1 . (B.2)
I begin by proving a preliminary result that is used in the text:
Lemma 1: Being a non-customer but playing Honest cannot be optimal.
Proof: Suppose it is optimal. Then
V1 = L1 + δλ1 V1 or V1 = L1 /(1 − δλ1),
and
V1 ≥ C1 + δλ1 b V1 .
Using this in (B.2),
b V1 ≥ π1
C1
1 − δλ1
+( 1− π1,λ0 [C1 + δλ1 b V1 ]+( 1− π1)(1 − λ0)[C1 + δλ1 b V1] .
Collecting terms and simplifying, this becomes
V1 ≥ C1 /(1 − δλ1).
Combining this with the above expression for V1,w eh a v eL1 ≥ C1, which is inconsistent
with the payoﬀs of the one-shot game. QED
Now turn to the conditions for the strategy of becoming a customer and playing Honest
to be optimal. The dynamic programming relation yields the following:
Since the ﬁrst choice is (by assumption) optimal:
V1 =( α2 + γ2)H1 + β2 L1 − F1 + δλ1 V1 , (B.3)
or
V1 =
(α2 + γ2)H1 + β2 L1 − F1
1 − δλ1
. (B.4)
Comparing the ﬁrst and the second choices:
V1 ≥ (α2 + γ2)W1 + β2 C1 − F1 + δλ1 b V1 , (B.5)
or combining this with (B.3),
(α2 + γ2)(W1 − H1)+β2 (C1 − L1) ≤ δλ1 [V1 − b V1 ]. (B.6)
Comparing the ﬁrst and the third choices:
V1 ≥ L1 + δλ1 V1 , (B.7)
30or combining this with (B.3),
F1 ≤ (α2 + γ2)H1 + β2 L1 − L1 =( α2 + γ2)(H1 − L1). (B.8)
Comparing the ﬁrst and the fourth choices:
V1 ≥ C1 + δλ1 b V1 , (B.9)
or, combining this with (B.3),
F1 ≤ (α2 + γ2)H1 + β2 L1 − C1 + δλ1 [V1 − b V1 ]. (B.10)
A preliminary result makes some of these inequalities redundant.
Lemma 2: F1 < (α2 + γ2)H1 + β2 L1 − C1 .
Proof: Suppose otherwise, that is,
(α2 + γ2)H1 + β2 L1 − F1 ≤ C1 .
Using this in (B.3),




Next, using (B.9) in (B.2),
b V1 ≥ π1
C1
1 − δλ1
+( 1− π1,λ0 [C1 + δλ1 b V1 ]++ ( 1− π1)(1 − λ0)[C1 + δλ1 b V1 ],
which simpliﬁes to
b V1 ≥ C1/(1 − δλ1).
Therefore (B.9) becomes







But we proved the opposite weak inequality above from the contradiction hypothesis, there-















We proved the opposite weak inequality just above, so b V1 = C1/(1 − δλ1)a l s o .
Finally, using V1 = b V1 in (B.6),
(α2 + γ2)(W1 − H1)+β2 (C1 − L1) ≤ 0,
which is incompatible with the payoﬀs of the one-shot game. QED
31Now we can proceed to ﬁnd the conditions for the speciﬁe ds t a t i o n a r ys t a t et ob ea n
equilibrium. First, (B.6) implies V1 ≥ b V1, and then Lemma 2 implies that the inequality
(B.10) is slack. Moreover, since C1 >L 1,
(α2 + γ2)H1 + β2 L1 − L1 > (α2 + γ2)H1 + β2 L1 − C1 ;
then by Lemma 2 the inequality (B.8) is also slack. This leaves us to consider (B.3) and
(B.6).
Observe that
V1 = π1 V1 +( 1− π1)λ0 V1 +( 1− π1)(1 − λ0)V1
= π1 V1 +( 1− π1)λ0 [(α2 + γ2)H1 + β2 L1 − F1 + δλ1 V1]+( 1− π1)(1 − λ0)V1 ,
where the ﬁrst line is an identity since the probabilities that are used as coeﬃcients sum to
1, and the second line uses (B.3). Subtract (B.2) from this, to obtain






+(1−π1)λ0 [(α2+γ2)H1+β2 L1−F1−C1 ]+(1−π1)λ0 δλ1 [V1−b V1 ].
Using (B.3), this “simpliﬁes” to
V1 − b V1 =
(α2 + γ2)H1 + β2 L1 − F1 − C1
1 − δλ1
π1 +( 1− π1)λ0 (1 − δλ1)
1 − δλ1 λ0 (1 − π1)
.
Substituting in (B.6) and rearranging terms, we have
F1 ≤ [(α2 + γ2)H1 + β2 L1 − C1 ]( B . 1 1 )
− [(α2 + γ2)(W1 − H1)+β2 (C1 − L1)]
1
δλ1 − λ0 (1 − π1)
π1
1−δλ1 + λ0 (1 − π1)
The intuition for this was explained in the text. Info’s fee F1 must not be so large as
to extract the Opportunist’s entire one-shot beneﬁt from being his customer. If it were, the
customer would cheat for an immediate gain, and get the same future payoﬀsa si fh eh a d
not cheated. Info must give the customer enough surplus to induce him to stay honest. This
is a product of (i) the one-period gain from cheating (the term in the square brackets on
the second line on the right hand side), and (ii) an eﬀective discount rate that depends on
pure discounting, the probability of public detection, and the probabilities of the customer’s
and Info’s survival. The higher the probability of Info’s survival (λ0), and the higher the
probability of public detection (π1), the smaller is the eﬀective discount rate, and therefore
Info needs to give away less surplus.
C: Info’s Double-Crossing
Here I allow the possibility that Info can take an extra fee from a customer on one side to let
him cheat the customer on the other side. However, I restrict the analysis to the case where
32I n f ol i v e sf o re v e r( λ0 = 1). The punishment strategy that controls Info’s temptation to
double-cross is as follows. If a Side-1 Opportunist customer gets payoﬀ L1,t h e nw i t hp r o b -
ability q1 the relationship between him and Info switches to a punishment phase. Starting
the next period (if the trader is still alive), he becomes a non-customer and starts to play
Cheat. Every period thereafter (so long as the customer is still alive), the punishment phase
continues. The probability is generated by an iid device whose realizations are observed
(with common knowledge) by Info and this customer. Since the stage game has an equilib-
rium where Info would double-cross a customer and therefore the trader does not become a
customer, the common-knowledge expectation of the punishment process is self-fulﬁlling.
The customer’s cheating during the punishment phase is regarded as authorized and
therefore does not result in a public Bad label. But Info may try to extort an extra fee later
by threatening to say that it was unauthorized. The condition to rule this out is the same
no-extortion condition as in the text.
I will look for an equilibrium where Info does not double-cross. Since there are Side-2 Dis-
honests who are customers of Info but Cheat, in equilibrium play a Side-1 Opportunist will
get the payoﬀ L1 with probability β2. In that event, with probability λ1 q1 the punishment
phase will be triggered — he will survive and become a non-customer next period. And some-
one in this situation will stay in it the following period with probability λ1. (With probability
1 − λ1 he will die, and his replacement will start afresh in the customer phase.) Therefore
Side-1 Opportunists switch between the customer and punishment categories according to
the transition matrix shown in Table 6:
Table 6: Transition Matrix for Opportunists
To category
Customer Punishment
From Customer 1 − β2 λ1 q1 β2 λ1 q1
category Punishment 1 − λ1 λ1
Then the ergodic proportion of the non-customer category, say x,i sd e ﬁned by the equation
x =( 1− x) β2 λ1 q1 + x λ1 .
Solving for x, the population proportions of Side-1 Opportunist customers and non-customers,
denoted by κ1 and ν1 (with κ1 + ν1 = γ1), are
κ1 =( 1− x)γ1 =
1 − λ1
1 − λ1 + β2 λ1 q1
γ1, ν1 = xγ1 =
β2 λ1 q1
1 − λ1 + β2 λ1 q1
γ1 . (C.1)
Now we can obtain the condition for Info not to double-cross a customer on Side 1.
If he does so, the match on Side 2 gains an extra W2 − H2, and this is the maximum
Info can extract from him. The probability that the Side 1 customer is an Opportunist is
κ1/(1−ν1)=κ1/(α1+β1+κ1). In that event, the punishment phase will kick in, and while it
33lasts, Info will lose the fee he charges, say F1. The expected present value of this is calculated
using the eﬀective discount factor δλ1. Therefore the no-double-crossing condition is












(W2 − H2). (C.2)
Next consider the Side 1 Opportunist customer’s decision. His match on Side 2 may be
a customer who is Honest, Opportunist, or Dishonest with respective probabilities α2, κ2
and β2, or with probability ν2 a non-customer in the punishment phase. He himself may
choose to be a customer and act Honest (in the candidate equilibrium), or deviate to be a
non-customer and/or cheat. So his dynamic programming problem is
V1 =m a x
n
(α2 + κ2)H1 + ν2 C1 + β2 L1 − F1 + δλ1 V1 − q1 β2 δλ1 (V1 − V 1),
(α2 + κ2)W1 + ν2 C1 + β2 C1 − F1 + δλ1 b V1 ,
L1 + δλ1 V1 ,C 1 + δλ1 b V1
o
, (C.3)
Here V 1 is the continuation payoﬀ when the probabilistic punishment phase intended to
control Info’s double-crossing is triggered by a chance meeting with a Side-2 Dishonest, and
b V1 is the continuation payoﬀ in the punishment phase triggered by the Side-1 Opportunist’s
own cheating.
From the rules of the probabilistic punishment phase, we have the recursion formula for
its continuation payoﬀ:
V 1 = C1 + δλ 1 V 1, therefore V 1 = C1 /(1 − δλ1),
and
V1 − V 1 =
(1 − δλ1)V1 − C1
1 − δλ 1
. (C.4)
Next, as in Lemma 1 of Appendix B, it cannot be optimal to take the third action
on the right hand side of the dynamic programming recursion (being a non-customer but
choosing Honest). Then we can write recursion equations for the continuation payoﬀ when
the customer cheats:
b V1 = π1
C1
1 − δλ 1
+( 1− π1)(C1 + δλ 1 b V1).
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side is what happens if the cheating gets a public bad label;
t h es e c o n dt e r mi sw h e no n l yI n f oﬁnds out. This simpliﬁes to
b V1 =
C1
1 − δλ 1
. (C.5)
34Now the analysis proceeds as in Appendix B. The important condition is that for the
ﬁrst choice in the dynamic programming problem (C.3) to be better than the second. After
some algebra, this can be written as
(α2 + κ2)(W1 − H1)+β2 (C1 − L1) ≤
1
ρ1
[(α2 + κ2)H1 + ν2 C1 + β2 L1 − C1 − F1 ],
where
ρ1 =
1 − δλ 1 (1 − q1 β2)
δλ 1 (1 − q1 β2)
. (C.6)
As usual, the condition says that the one-time gain should not exceed the capitalized expected
value of the subsequent stream of losses during the punishment. The eﬀective discount rate
is given by (C.6). If the punishment phase to control Info’s double-crossing did not have
to be triggered with positive probability along the equilibrium path, that is, if β2 =0o r
q1 = 0, then the discount rate would be just the familiar ρ1 =1 /(δλ 1) − 1. But because
of the additional need to control Info’s double-crossing, the eﬀective discount rate is larger.
Then the condition can be written as
F1 ≤ [(α2 +κ2)H1 +ν2 C1 +β2 L1 −C1 ]− ρ1 [(α2 +κ2)(W1 −H1)+β2 (C1 − L1)]. (C.7)
Thus, to control the Side-1 Opportunist’s cheating as well as Info’s double-crossing, we
need F1 and q1 to satisfy both (C.2) and (C.7). In particular, to control Info’s double-crossing
in this situation of imperfect information, we need a punishment that is sometimes triggered
even when Info has remained faithful. This lowers the customer’s payoﬀ from staying Honest.
To retain his incentive, Info has to give him more rent.
D: The Opportunist and Enfo
The analysis is similar to that in Appendix C, and the same notation is used without redeﬁ-
nition. The one crucial diﬀerence is that a trader who chooses not to be a customer does not
have the possibility of cheating any of Enfo’s customers. I will assume that the customers
who are temporarily in a punishment phase can cheat others of the same kind and be cheated
by anyone; the results are unaﬀected if no cheating can occur at either of these.
The Side-1 Opportunist’s dynamic programming problem is now
V1 =m a x
n
(α2 + κ2)H1 + ν2 C1 + β2 L1 − F1 + δλ1 V1 − q1 β2 δλ1 (V1 − V 1),




V 1 = ν2 C1 + δλ 1 V 1 ,
and then
V1 − V 1 =
(1 − δλ1)V1 − ν2 C1
1 − δλ 1
. (D.2)
35For the ﬁrst choice on the right hand side in (D.1) to be optimal, we need
V1 =( α2 + κ2)H1 + ν2 C1 + β2 L1 − F1 + δλ1 V1 − q1 β2 δλ1 (V1 − V 1)
≥ ν2 C1 + δλ1 V1 .
Using (D.2), the equation yields
(1 − δλ1)V1 − ν2 C1 =
1 − δλ1
1 − δλ 1 + β2 δλ 1 q1
[(α2 + κ2)H1 + β2 L1 − F1 ]. (D.3)
Then the inequality can be written as
(α2 + κ2)H1 + β2 L1 − F1 ≥ β2 δλ1 q1 (V1 − V 1)
=
β2 δλ1 q1
1 − δλ 1 + β2 δλ 1 q1
[(α2 + κ2)H1 + β2 L1 − F1 ].
This simpliﬁes to
F1 ≤ (α2 + κ2)H1 + β2 L1,. (D.4)
The analysis and the condition to rule out Enfo’s double-crossing is similar to that in
Appendix C except that if Enfo double-crosses a Side-1 customer, he saves the extra cost Z2






(W2 − H2 + Z2). (D.5)
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